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The Editor hopes that 'this number of LCM' sees the last of his experiments with reduction and type faces, the latter of which he owes to a suggestion by Professor J.K.Davies and the former of which is only 15%. It still means that more material can be fitted into the first postal step: the size of the backlog (the penalty of notoriety?) requires the first and the increased postal charges the second. But this means more typing, and this could charitably (but falsely) be made to account for the delay in the appearance of this number, for which he apologizes. Other concerns have also re-surfaced after a 'period of apparent well-being' (*et caeco carpitur igni?*) - plans for the 're-structuring' of Classics in this and other British Universities. Here what he has rather naughtily nicknamed a 'School of Ancient Rubbish' including Egyptology and Oriental Studies has been mooted, with 5-7 jobs to go from 20, and the Editor may find it hard to, and perhaps ought not to resist early retirement, which would presumably give him more time for LCM and work on Homer and Livy. He would be glad to hear from other Departments in the country, for the consequences should be widely known both at home and abroad. But he has deliberately restrained his prolixity by a note.

H.M.HINE(Edinburgh): *obiter dicta on dicto* = dictito

LCM 7.3(Mar.1982), 29

In his commentary on Tacitus, Ann.1.72.1, Goodyear suggests that *dicto* was never used in the sense of *dictito* in classical Latin. He points out that, of only five examples of *dicto* = *dictito* in respectable authors, two are shaky on grounds of sense or transmission, and in the other three corruption of *dictito* may easily be postulated (*The Annals of Tacitus Books 1-6 edited with a commentary by F.R.D.Goodyear, Vol.II, Annals 1.55-81 and Annals 2* [Cambridge Classical Texts and Commentaries 23], Cambridge 1981, 140-1). He is probably right to banish this use of *dicto*, but I offer observations on two of the five passages.

First, is there doubt about the transmission of *dictasse* at Gellius 4.11.14? TLL 5.1.1013.60, to be sure, reports that VPR read *fuisse dictitasse* (Hertz conjectured *fuisse se dictasse*), but Hertz's editio maior (1883-5) and Hosius' Teubner (1903) both say that VPR have *dictasse*, not *dictitasse*, and Marache's Budé (1967) implies the same when it reports *dictitasse* from the recentiores, as does Hertz.

Secondly, the transmission is not unanimous at Seneca NQ 5.18.4, where manuscript Z has not *dictatum est* [6n: om. 0] but *dictum est* (cf. Oltramare's Budé). At this point Z is sole representative of one of the two branches of the tradition (see CQ ns30[1980], 183-217), so its reading may be accepted without hesitation. If one is tempted by *dictitatum* (Erasmus), observe that *dictitare* is not found in Seneca, and that the adjacent *uulgo* [uolgo Z] renders a frequentative unnecessary (yet not impossible; cf. TLL 5.1.1009.7-10 for similar tautologies). In discussion of wider problems in the text of NQ 5.18.4 at LCM 3.4(Apr.1978), 83-7, I failed (p.84) to scrutinize the credentials of *dictatum* (also I toyed with altering Z's *ex re publica* to the customary *e re publica*; unnecessarily, in all probability, for Seneca again alters a standard formula at NQ 3.pr.16, where he twice has *e iure* [euenire an] *Quiritium*, although *ex iure* was the norm in this and other legal phrases [see TLL 5.2.1008.48-50; 7.2.696.61-66 & 700.23-24; *Vocabularium Iurisprudentiae Romanae* 2.643.46 - 644.2]).

At SHA Gord.20.2 *recitasse* is inviting in place of *dictasse*. That leaves *dictare* = *dictitare* in Gellius 4.1.2 (not 4.2.1) and 4.11.14, and Tacitus Ann.1.72.1. Both these authors use *dictitare* regularly, so emendation of *dictare* is probably the right course.



In making his cautious judgement that Catullus 35, with its repetition of *incohata* (13 & 18), represents a *censura* of Caecilius' epyllion on Cybele, Böhrens displayed an astute awareness of the subtlety and ambiguity of this verse epistle<sup>1</sup>. Ever since, editors and commentators have taken it upon themselves either to uphold or to reject his judgement<sup>2</sup>. Recently, independent evaluations of 35 have illustrated, in differing ways, that this preoccupation with *incohata* has resulted in the neglect of other elements crucial for an understanding of this poem<sup>3</sup>. While such redirections in critical outlook are refreshing, the *explicatio* of poem 35 nonetheless remains incomplete, for there are several important elements as yet unexplored.

One such element is a simple, but over-looked, detail within the poem: at line 16, Caecilius' girlfriend is addressed directly by Catullus - *ignosco tibi ... puella*. Among editors, only Ellis is explicit in pointing out that *puella* is vocative, and even then he does not elaborate upon the implication of this point<sup>4</sup>. This address to the girl does, however, raise an important question: In a poem ostensibly intended as an epistle to Caecilius, why is it that the girlfriend is addressed directly, while Caecilius himself is not? We must remember, after all, that the formal addressee of the poem is the papyrus (2), which is politely requested to take this message to Caecilius. In itself the address to the papyrus can be seen as a matter of *urbanitas*<sup>5</sup>, or perhaps as detached tactfulness<sup>6</sup> in bringing up a delicate subject. But the direct address to the *puella* underscores the fact that *Caecilio* (2) - emphatically juxtaposed to the vocative *papyre* (2) - stands as the indirect object of the opening sentence. This antithesis is heightened further by another observation. Catullus describes the girl as *Sapphica ... musa doctior* (16-17), while Caecilius is described as *poetae tenero, meo sodali* (1). Caecilius may be both a poet<sup>7</sup> and a close friend - *sodalis* is an important word for Catullus and his group - but the girl's literary expertise seems to approach, if not to surpass, that of Caecilius. Consequently most commentators see this description of the *puella* as less than sincere<sup>8</sup>, an interpretation that, as I hope to demonstrate, misses the mark of the comparison.

A second area of inquiry, which lies outside the formal limits of this poem, has been equally neglected. At line 14 Catullus describes Caecilius' poem on Cybele as *Dindymi dominam*<sup>9</sup>, a phrase which is echoed in Catullus' own poem on Cybele, his *Attis*: at 63.13, Cybele is referred to as *Dindymenae dominae*, and at 63.91, she is invoked as *domina Dindymi*. Although these parallels have certainly been pointed out before, no one has elaborated the significance of this point. The latter reference from 63 is particularly evocative, for the very same words are used as are employed in 35, with the distinction that the word order has been reversed. And there is a further distinction as well. The phrase in 35 occurs at the beginning of the line, while in 63 it occupies the final position. It is admittedly impossible to know whether or not Catullus' *Attis* preceded Caecilius' poem on the same subject, nor does it much matter<sup>10</sup>. What matters more is that, for obvious reasons, Catullus was interested in the poem of Caecilius, not only because he was a friend - and presumably a fellow neoteric<sup>11</sup> - but more importantly perhaps because of the subject matter of the poem itself.

1. E.Böhrens, *Catulli Veronensis Liber*, Leipzig 1885, 215: *hoc epyllion tantum 'incohaverat' ille [i.e. Caecilius], quo verbo Catullus tacitam mihi egisse videtur censuram, ad summam perfectionem haec deesse illa significans.*
2. In favour of Böhrens' judgement are F.O.Copley, 'Catullus 35', *AJP* 74 (1953), 149-160; J.M.Fisher, 'Catullus 35', *CP* 66 (1971), 1-5; and among editors K.Quinn, *Catullus. The Poems*, New York 1970, 194-8. Against it are especially W.Kroll, *C. Valerius Catullus*, Stuttgart 1959, 64-6; C.J.Fordyce, *Catullus*, Oxford 1961, 176-8; and to a lesser degree P.Ellis, *A Commentary on Catullus*, Oxford 1889, 120-23.
3. H.A.Kahn, 'Catullus 35 - and the things Poetry can do to you!', *Hermes* 102 (1974), 475-490; S.Onetti & G.Maurach, 'Catullus 35', *Gymnasium* 81 (1974), 481-5; R.Heine, 'Zu Catull c.35', *Wege der Forschung*, Darmstadt 1975, 62-84.
4. Cf. the peculiar rationalization of *ignosco tibi* by Onetti & Maurach (n.3) 484 n.18; see also Heine (n.3), 75 n.48 on *ignosco*.
5. Quinn (n.2), ad loc..
6. Kahn (n.3), 478.
7. Heine (n.3), 65, sees in *poetae* an undertone of irony: *Catull also gebraucht ... poeta nur in den polymetrischen nugae des ersten Teils, und er gebraucht es in den anderen nugae ausserhalb von c.35 nur in spöttischen, ironischen, abwertenden Ton.* He thus sees the use of the word in 35 as *gefühlbetonter, herablassender, liebenswürdig-spöttisch*.
8. Almost all commentators see this description as an exaggeration; see especially Kroll, Fordyce and Quinn ad loc.. Cf. also Copley (n.2), 156-8, and Onetti & Maurach (n.3), 484. Heine (n.3), 75, sees it as sincere praise.
9. This phrase may well represent the title of Caecilius' poem; see Quinn and Fordyce ad loc., and Onetti & Maurach (n.3), 483 n.15.
10. Although the chronology of the Catullan corpus is a very complex problem, I would suggest, from a discussion of parallel passages (see below), that 63 was perhaps written before 35. It could also be argued that 63 is Catullus' response to Caecilius' poem.
11. A point made by Fisher (n.2), 1; Onetti & Maurach (n.3), 481-2; Kahn (n.3), 476-7. See also n.7 above.



The parallelism of 35.14 and 63.91 seems to invite the reader to look more closely, in a comparative way, at the two poems. As we will see, there are other, more subtle parallels that exist between 35 and 63. In fact, by using poem 63 as a sort of commentary on 35, it may be possible to make a cautious judgement about the antithesis between the indirect address to Caecilius and the direct address to his girlfriend.

Let us first focus on the middle section (7-12) of the poem. Here Catullus imagines a potential reason why Caecilius might reject the invitation to come to Verona: his girlfriend, madly in love with him, will no doubt try to detain him. In this context the phrase *manus-que collo | ambas iniiciens* (9-10) has not, to my mind, received the attention it deserves. In the past this phrase has either been interpreted as an erudite reference to the legal procedure *manus iniectio*<sup>12</sup>, or else it has been taken as a particularly vivid example to illustrate the wild, unrestrained passion - *impotente amore* (12) - which has now gripped the girl<sup>13</sup>. Although these implications may certainly be present, the underlying complexity of this expression has not been understood. A brief glance at 63 can provide valuable insight into the power of this phrase.

Recent work on poem 63 has shown that the theme of love and marriage is an integral part of the poem<sup>14</sup>. Especially important for our present purpose is the image of the *iugum*, which appears in a well-known simile (33) and subsequently reemerges toward the end of the poem (76 & 84). Sandy's comments provide a good summation (p.193):

Attis is *indomita*, unreconciled to accepting the consequences (conjugal fidelity) of his pact with his consort Cybele. She then reasserts her authority and renews the bond in the form of a yoke. She removes the yoke from her lions (76 & 84) only to place it on the shoulders of Attis, who, like a heifer, has attempted to get out from under it. All this is not spelled out explicitly in the poem, but left to be inferred from the synonyms *vitans* (33) and *fugere* (8) applied in turn to a heifer and to Attis. Like the heifer that avoids (*vitans*) the yoke, Attis is too eager to avoid (*fugere*) Cybele's yoke, that is, an all-inclusive commitment to her.

With this detail from 63 we can better understand the full meaning and implication at 35.9-10. In throwing both arms around the neck of Caecilius, the girlfriend is doing much more than exhibiting the extent of her passion. Given the similar subject matter of 35 and 63, one is tempted to think that this description is meant to evoke the image of the *iugum* that is so much a part of Catullus' Attis. This point is vividly demonstrated by the choice of the word *ambas*. In making explicit the fact that both arms are used, Catullus shrewdly portrays the constriction of circular enclosure around the neck, a notion more readily apparent in the image of the *iugum*. The girl, of course, is not literally trying to yoke Caecilius; her reaction, rather, is a desperate attempt to restrain him from his journey to Verona, much as Cybele yokes Attis to keep him from returning to his longed-for homeland. Ironically, in a situation where all restraint has been lost, the girl's action here represents, on a figurative level, an attempt to establish control.

This apparent parallelism of Caecilius and his girlfriend with Attis and Cybele<sup>15</sup> is further indicated by other observations between the two poems. The girl, Catullus imagines, may summon Caecilius back, *euntem revocet* (9), a thought which is subtly echoed by Cybele's furious command to her lions to go fetch Attis: *fac uti furoris iotu reditum in nemora ferat* (63.79). Particularly important here is the phrase *reditum ... ferat*. By openly voicing his complaints, Attis has made it obvious that he wishes to escape - *qui fugere ... cupit* (80) - the domination of Cybele. Thus the yoke is prepared for him in order to bring him back. Similarly the girl in 35 figuratively 'yokes' Caecilius by hurling both arms around his neck, even though he has already set out on his journey (*euntem*) and she, like Cybele, is thus able to bring him back (*revocet*).

A further subtlety must be considered in this regard. It is important to remember that Attis' attempted rebellion is more than just vocalized complaint. In a pathetic attempt to escape this horror, Attis wanders down from the mountainside to the seashore - *rursus reditum in vada tetulit* (47) - and there makes his soliloquy. In addition, the lions, once unleashed by Cybele, find Attis on the seashore - *vidit Attin prope marmora pelagi* (86) - and immediately chase him back to the wilds of the mountainside, the *imperia* of Cybele. Having arrived in Phrygia by sea (1), this stance by the seashore represents for Attis a last desperate attempt to escape from servitude. This image of the seashore is marvellously reverberated in 35 by the grandiloquent sounding *relinquens ... litus* (3-4)<sup>16</sup>. If only Caecilius

12. Kahn (n.3) 497-80, although Kroll (n.2) disagrees: *mit der juristischen manus iniectio hat die Stelle nichts zu tun*.

13. So Copley (n.2) 156-7, Onetti & Maurach (n.3) 483 nn.11 & 12, and Heine (n.3) 72-4; Fisher (n.2) 3 cites Ovid, *Am.* 2.18.9-10 to support his bizarre contention that Caecilius is writing love poetry and has been distracted from his original purpose to write the epyllion.

14. Cf. especially G.N. Sandy, 'Catullus 63 and the Theme of Marriage', *AJP* 92(1971), 185-95, and J. Glenn, 'The Yoke of Attis', *CP* 68(1973), 59-61.

15. This double identification has also been seen by Heine (n.3) 72: *spiegelt sich in dem Verhältnis Caecilius-Freundin etwas von dem Verhältnis Attis-Cybele wider?*

16. Cf. Heine (n.3) 78.



can leave behind the shore and make his escape to Verona, Catullus speculates! Unfortunately there is every likelihood that Caecilius, like Attis, will be summoned back from the shore and the freedom that it represents.

A more direct parallel corroborates the identification of Caecilius with Attis. Catullus' description of his friend as *tenero* (1) has been seen universally as an indication of Caecilius' poetical inclinations, either as a love poet or at least as belonging to the neoteric group<sup>17</sup>. While this technical meaning of *tener* is undoubtedly present - its emphatic juxtaposition to *poetae* makes this clear - the overemphasis of this interpretation can unfortunately steer the reader away from a more subtle observation<sup>18</sup>. It is worth noting, after all, that the same adjective occurs in poem 63 in a context that cannot be taken in a technical literary sense. In exhorting his companions to orgiastic frenzy, Attis shakes Cybele's *tympanum* with his *tenerie ... digitis* (10); and even more telling is the fact that the lions of the goddess pursue a *tenerum ... Attin* (88) away from the seashore back to the mountainside. That both men, Attis and Caecilius, are characterized as *tener* - young, inexperienced, perhaps even vulnerable to domination - is a point that has been lost on most commentators<sup>19</sup>. Certainly a deliberate parallelism seems to be implied.

One final point needs to be added in this context. The metaphor *viam vorabit* (7) has been seen as an example of 'light-hearted exaggeration and colloquial vividness'<sup>20</sup>. But a different sense can be acquired if one bears in mind the apparent parallelism of poems 35 and 63. In this regard the phrase *viam vorabit* can be seen as a clever reflexion of the impulsiveness of Attis, indicated by the word *citus* and its compounds which occur many times throughout poem 63. More important, the phrase imparts a sense of urgency<sup>21</sup>. The significance of this thought is amplified by the identification with Attis: knowing what happened in the mythic account, Caecilius will want to make every effort to hurry out of this potential trouble, if he has any sense.

It is certainly true that parallel usages of words and phrases between two poems do not necessarily indicate a strict identification of their component elements. But what is compelling about the two poems 35 and 63 is that 1) they both unquestionably deal with the same subject matter, Cybele, and 2) they are both referred to by Catullus as *Dindymi domina* (35. 14 & 63.91). These sure reference points make it increasingly plausible that other parallels between the two poems do indicate an identification of their component elements. One must be careful, however, not to stress this double identification too much. There are, after all, fundamental differences between Caecilius and Attis. First, Caecilius, we presume, has the capacity of making an escape if he so desires, in marked contrast to Attis, who can no longer leave the domination of the goddess. Second, and more important, it is the *puella*, and not Caecilius, who is characterized by Catullus as acting under the impetus of *furor ... impotente amore* (12). Thus her actions, rather than Caecilius', seem to be more identifiable with the frenzy of Attis. But even if one accepts the identification of Caecilius and his *puella* with Attis and Cybele, this only raises a larger and potentially more difficult question: does Catullus intend this identification to be taken seriously? That is, are we to suppose that Catullus is trying implicitly to warn his friend away from a Cybele-like entrapment and emasculation? The answer to this question is not an unqualified yes or no is, rather, quite ambiguous.

On the one hand, a number of hints within the poem seem to point toward a veiled but serious warning. We have already seen above the urgency of the phrase *viam vorabit* (7). In addition the vehemence and quasi-violence of the girl in trying to 'yoke' Caecilius could also be taken in this manner, as a potential warning. A further indication can be seen in the phrase *quasdam ... cogitationes* (5) Ever since Bährens these thoughts have been taken as consisting of a literary nature<sup>22</sup>. Given the parallels between poems 35 and 63, however, one could construe these thoughts as pertaining not so much to Caecilius' poem as to his physical well-being: the rigid formality of the expression could be taken as a further sign of the urgency of the warning.

On the other hand, there are indications that seem to detract from, or even negate, the seriousness of this implicit warning. First, if Caecilius really is in danger, why does not

17. All editors cite Ovid, *RA* 757, *AA* 2.273, *Am.* 2.1.4, and Martial, 7.14.3 & 12.44.5, to show that *poeta tener* = 'poet of love'. Kroll views it more as an indication of neoteric tendencies; cf. also Onetti & Maurach (n.3) 481 n.4.

18. Copley (n.2) is correct to see in *tener* something other than a poetical credo: 'for whatever else *tener*, v.l., means, it certainly indicates the poet's youth' 155. Heine (n.3) 65-9 cites interesting passages from Cicero, *de div.* 1.66, and Persius, 1.99-102, among others, to show that *tener* can have a particular association with *furor*, a notion that is especially provocative for a Cybele poem.

19. Only Heine (n.3) 78 has noticed this parallelism in *tener*.

20. Kahn (n.3) 479; cf. also Quinn ad loc.. Particularly unimpressive is the judgement of Onetti & Maurach (n.3) 482 n.10: 'Such circumlocutions originate from the endeavor to avoid oversimple words like *ire*'

21. Only Copley (n.2) 153-6 has seen the underlying urgency of this expression

22. So Quinn, Copley and Fisher (n.2); Onetti & Maurach (n.3), following Kroll, try to minimize the emphasis of the phrase.



Catullus tell him more directly? In this regard one wonders why Caecilius is the indirect object, and not the actual addressee of the poem. Further, if the *puella* really does represent a Cybele-like threat to Catullus' friend, it is most peculiar that Catullus pardons her (*ignosce tibi* 16) for this behaviour, and, what is more ironic, in a direct address to her. Clearly we are still left with the same antithesis with which this inquiry began. And there is a further point. It is clear from lines 13-15 that Caecilius' poem, though unfinished, is the cause of this whole dilemma: the girl has fallen passionately in love with him only after she has read his poem on Cybele. Consequently, from reading about this powerful goddess, the *puella* has begun - by association perhaps - to take on the attributes of Cybele, a point most vividly illustrated by her attempt to 'yoke' Caecilius. Ironically, then, Caecilius and his poetical talent can be seen as the ultimate cause of the problem that threatens him.

It is from this latter point that we can best gain a balanced perspective on the intention of this poem. Kahn has shown, by drawing an astute example from Aristophanes' *Frogs*, as well as from other examples<sup>23</sup>, 'that what a person reads ... can operate like a magic curse or love charm' (p.487). Catullus himself would agree wholeheartedly with this sentiment, for we have only to recall his own statement of poetical cause and effect as set forth in poem 50. Having composed some *versiculi* with Licinius Calvus Catullus went away and suffered all the symptoms of love: excitement (8), loss of appetite (9), sleeplessness (10), *dolor* (17), in short the wild passion characterized by *furor* (11). Curiously, this reaction is brought on by the fact that, as a poet, Catullus appreciates immensely the wit and charm of Calvus' verse. Based on his own personal experience, then, Catullus would have no difficulty in believing that poetry can have an extraordinary, magical effect.

And this phenomenon, we presume, is precisely what is alluded to in poem 35. In reading Caecilius' poem on Cybele, the girl has been affected in a marvellous way, for she has assumed the characteristics of the mythical figures, undergoing by association a seizure of *furor* no less intense than that of Attis, and simultaneously assuming, in a Cybele-like transformation, the goddess's wish to dominate and control her mortal worshipper<sup>24</sup>. This point is underscored dramatically by the epithet *doctior* (17). As all commentators have noted, the word *doctus* rings clear with literary implications<sup>25</sup>. Certainly this *puella* has literary talents herself; she may even be a poet, as Kroll suggests. What is important, though, is that this girl, as a *docta*, has an understanding of and appreciation for the real power of poetry, much like Catullus himself. And this makes her poetically-induced transformation that much more appealing to Catullus himself.

From this perspective we can better evaluate the questions that have been raised about this poem. Clearly we can understand that Catullus pardons the girl's behaviour because he himself can well identify with such a reaction to good poetry. In fact, by addressing the girl directly Catullus displays his respect for her literary taste and understanding; it is a direct and open statement of approval from Catullus, who can be a playful, yet incisive, critic of his friends' *deliciae*<sup>26</sup>. But Catullus projects his approval to an even higher level, to something approaching both amazement and pity. By comparing the girl with Sappho - *Sapphica ... musa doctior* (16-17) - Catullus is cleverly acknowledging the underlying reason for the girl's transformation. To elevate the girl above Sappho, traditionally identified as the tenth muse<sup>27</sup>, is to pay high tribute to her literary expertise: this *docta puella* has, after all, understood Caecilius' unfinished poem all too well, since she has assumed the attributes of both the vengeful goddess and the mortal whose *furor* the girl now embodies. Catullus is awed by the depth and intensity of her literary comprehension, and in this way the comparison with Sappho is not an 'extravagant compliment'<sup>28</sup>; it represents, rather, a sincere compliment. In addition there may even be a slight note of pathos in Catullus' praise, hinted at by the diminutive *misellae* (14): the girl's literary sensitivity has flung her, poor wretch, into a highly emotional scenario, once fictive but now real. Catullus, having suffered something similar as a result of the *versiculi* of Calvus, can both admire and commiserate with the *puella*, whom he has presumably not yet had the pleasure of meeting - *si mihi vera nuntiantur* (11).

These observations, of course, bode well for Caecilius and his poetical talent. A poem that elicits such a powerful reaction from its audience (the *puella*) - and especially from an audience so literarily sophisticated (*doctior*) - must clearly be a work of high quality. In this way the repetition of *incohata* represents a high compliment for Caecilius' poem, and not a *censura* as Böhrens and others have seen it<sup>29</sup>. His poem is stirring enough to cause the transformation of the *puella*, even though it has only been begun - *incohata* (13)<sup>30</sup>. The

23. Kahn (n.3) especially pp.483-7 for other references.

24. Cf. the similar thought of Heine (n.3), 82-3.

25. Cf. especially Ellis (n.2) ad loc., who cites valuable passages from Propertius and others.

26. See, e.g., Catullus' criticism of Varus' *puella* in poem 10 and of Flavius' in poem 6.

27. See especially Ellis, ad loc., for the references; cf. also Fordyce and Quinn (n.2), ad loc., and Heine (n.3) 75 n.49.

28. Quinn and Fordyce (n.2) ad loc.; cf n.8 above.

29. Cf. the similar thought of Onetti & Maurach (n.3), 484-5.

30. Accordingly I propose that the participle *incohata* (13) be taken concessively. Cf. Fordyce and Kroll ad loc., Kahn 488 and Heine 82.



repetition of *incohata* (18), coupled with the adverb *venuste*, serves both to emphasize this implicit compliment and at the same time to make a clever word-play with *venuste*: Caecilius' poem, started 'In Venus-fashion', has already resulted in the passionate aphrodisiac response of the *puella*<sup>31</sup>. The repetition of *incohata*, therefore, causes one to ponder a further point: If the poem, just begun, is so well done as to bring on a Cybele-like transformation, what will happen to the girl, and presumably to Caecilius as a result, when the poem is complete?

This last observation, in fact, brings up a final point, for Catullus' compliment seems to be double-edged: the sincere praise for the poem of Caecilius is at the same time tempered by a subtle, but darker, note of caution. This caution is made manifest in a number of ways, most prominently in the repetition of *incohata*, but also in the underlying urgency that, as we have seen above, is present throughout the poem. It is perhaps in this context that we can best understand the indirect address to Caecilius. The obvious fact that Caecilius is not addressed directly - the dative *Caecilio* (2 & 18) serves almost to frame the poem at beginning and end - is perhaps a deliberate attempt at detached aloofness, not necessarily arising out of a sense of tactful diplomacy but more probably as a further indication of Catullus' hesitancy and sense of urgency. The deliberate non-address to Caecilius, dramatically outlined by the vocative *puella*, is intended to relay a signal that the *cogitationes* are both of a literary and, at the same time, more than literary kind. The force of *cogitationes* is thus perhaps two-fold, indicating that Catullus has 'advice' to impart to Caecilius on how to finish the poem, from a technical standpoint, and also in such a way that Caecilius does not literally end up like Attis. In other words, *incohata* reiterated may be Catullus' way of saying that, as far as Caecilius' well-being is concerned, the poem would be better left unfinished. Catullus is at once encouraged, but apprehensive about the just-started poem of Caecilius, encouraged, as a fellow neoteric (*poetae tenero*), by the obvious quality of the poem, but apprehensive, as a personal friend (*meo sodali*), about the direct effect it is having on the *puella* and may, as a result, have on Caecilius<sup>32</sup>. There is, therefore, a strong undercurrent of ambivalence in poem 35 that ultimately remains unresolved. Caecilius, Catullus intimates, may actually have too much of a good thing!

31. Cf. the similar sentiment of Kahn (n.3) 483-5. On *venuste* see also Heine (n.3) 80-82.

32. Heine (n.3) 83-4 expresses a similar thought: *incohata schillernd zwischen Reverenz vor den mächtigen Wirkungen eines erst begonnenen Werkes und möglicherweise einer Warnung, den Anfängen dieser Wirkung zu wehren*

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A.H.SOMMERSTEIN (Nottingham): *Five notes on Sophocles' Philoctetes* (147: 271-284: 705: 782ff.: 1075) and one on his Oedipus Tyrannus (603-4)

LCM 7.3 (Mar. 1982), 34-37

1) In response to his sailors' request for orders (135-143) Neoptolemos gives them the following instructions:

νῦν μὲν, ἴσως γὰρ τόπον ἔσχατιᾶς  
προσιδεῖν ἐθέλεις ὄντινα κεῖται,  
ἔρκου θαρσῶν· ὁπότεν δὲ μόλις  
δεῖνός τ' ὀδύτης τῶνδ' ἐκ μελάρων† 147  
πρὸς ἐμὴν αἰεὶ χεῖρα προχωρῶν  
πειρῶ τὸ παρὼν θεραπεύειν.

147 ἐκ τῆς οὐκ *mutavit Linwood*: ἰδρυτῆς τῶνδε μελάρων *Dawe*

Dawe's ἰδρυτῆς (*Studies on the text of Sophocles* iii [Leiden 1978] 124) is a substantial improvement, but the problems of the second metron of 147 are still not satisfactorily solved. It is true that if we remove ἐκ we no longer have to marvel at the prescience of a Neoptolemos who knows that when Philoctetes returns to his cave he will enter it from the far side, or to juggle unconvincingly with text or punctuation in order to deprive him of this implausible knowledge; but another difficulty posed by the transmitted text is if anything augmented. According to Dawe's text the chorus are here told that Philoctetes is 'the inhabitant of these μέλαρα', and with these words Neoptolemos would be almost bound to point out Philoctetes' cave with a gesture. Yet half a dozen lines later (153-4) the chorus are asking, not only where Philoctetes is at this moment, but also which cave he lives in: λέγ' αὐλὰς ποίας ἐνεδρος | ναίει καὶ χώρον τίν' ἔχει, and this question is duly answered by Neoptolemos: οἶκον μὲν ὁρᾷς τόνδ' (159). The sailors of this chorus are not men of deep intellect, but one does not expect them to ask a question to which they have just been given a perfectly straightforward answer.

Jebb saw this problem, and his solution was to understand αὐλὰς ποίας as meaning, not 'what shelter', but 'what sort of shelter'. This is not much of an improvement. The chorus can see for themselves that only one kind of shelter is available in the vicinity, namely caves in the rocks; and if they want to know more about what Philoctetes' cave is like, they have Neoptolemos' permission to look around while the coast is clear (146). There is only one item of knowledge that they have no way of discovering for themselves: which of the



several caves they can apparently see is the one in which Philoctetes lives. Only Neoptolemos, who found and identified the cave in their absence, can tell them this; and this must be what they are asking him at 153-4. But according to the manuscripts, and also according to Dawe, he has already told them.

The reader may have guessed by now that I am going to propose the deletion of the words τῶνδ' (ἐκ) μελάρων. The sense does not require them, in any form; an objective genitive for ἰδρυτής can easily be understood out of τόπον ἐσχατιᾶς (144), and δεινὸς ἰδρυτής may be rendered 'its dangerous inhabitant' ('dangerous', not [as Dawe] 'clever'; it takes no very great cleverness to make one's home in a cave when no other shelter is available, and Philoctetes, even allowing for his malady, has not shown himself an exceptionally accomplished Robinson Crusoe [cf. 35-6 on the crude workmanship of his drinking-cup]; and 'dangerous' suits a man who is expected to be suspicious of all strangers [136] and who possesses a deadly and unerring weapon). Not till 159 does Neoptolemos indicate to the sailors which is Philoctetes' cave; his words in 144-5, 'perhaps you want to see what place on the shore is his lair', do not themselves identify the particular cave and are not naturally accompanied by a gesture identifying it.

What was the interpolator's motive? Probably he wanted to add precision to the seemingly vague verb μόλῃ (which in fact is precise enough as it stands, meaning 'comes back', 'comes home': cf. *Aj.* 1183, *El.* 626 & 1234, *Aesch. Ag.* 34, 345 & 1225, and see Fraenkel on *Ag.* 675) and so added τῶνδ' ἐκ μελάρων (μέλαρα for the cave may have been inspired by 1453). Compare the interpolation in 1365-7, intended at least in part to make plainer what action πατρὸς γέρας συλῶντες (1365) referred to. That our man chose to say 'out of this dwelling' rather than 'to this dwelling' shows that he believed, rightly or wrongly (rightly, I think, but this is not the place to argue the matter), that when Philoctetes eventually does appear on the scene he appears from the cave. Unfortunately he forgot (as wiser men than he have done, historians as well as literary critics) that his knowledge of what was to happen later was not shared by those participating in the action, and he also failed to visualize the gesture that his τῶνδ' would almost inevitably entail; so that where he had hoped to import precision, he only imported confusion.

2) In 271-284 Philoctetes describes how Agamemnon, Menelaos and Odysseus (264) brought him to Lemnos, how he was left asleep in a cave on the seashore there, and how he woke to find them gone and himself left alone with nothing but a bit of food and a ragged garment or two; and he prays 'May they suffer the like' (275). The narrative and the imprecation can hardly fail to remind the hearer that one of those concerned, Odysseus, did have a similar experience many years later, when he was landed in Ithaca. Odysseus too was put ashore in his sleep and left alone on the seashore (near a cave, too); but in what different circumstances! The island was his own country; he was left sleeping under a sheet and a coverlet (*Od.* 13.118), and not far off, placed carefully where no thief would see them, were the treasures he had been given in Scheria. Nevertheless when he woke up, not recognizing the landscape, Odysseus cried out in distress (*ᾤμωξεν Od.* 13.198, cf. *ἀποιμῶσαι Phil.* 278), thought that the Phaeacians had cheated him, and prayed for Zeus to punish them (*Od.* 13.200-216). To that extent, and to that extent only, he underwent the same experience as Philoctetes.

Philoctetes' experience here narrated has another echo within the play itself, in 766-881. Philoctetes, knowing that after his attack of pain he will fall asleep, entrusts his bow to Neoptolemos (776); and eventually, at 826 or shortly after, he duly does fall asleep. The logical thing for Neoptolemos now is to do what Odysseus and the rest had done on that earlier occasion; but despite the chorus' urging, he does not do it, and when Philoctetes wakes up it is to find, against all expectation (867-71), that his young friend is still there and so is his bow. It is the first time in ten years that any other human being has proved to Philoctetes that he deserves to be trusted. Neoptolemos, from whatever mixture of motives, has behaved not as Odysseus and the Atreidae did to Philoctetes, but as the Phaiakians will do to Odysseus.

3)

εἶρε δ' ἄλλοτ' ἄλλαχᾶ  
τότ' ἂν εἰλυόμενος,  
παῖς ἄτερ ὡς φίλας τιθή-  
νας, ὅθεν εὐμάρει ὑπάρ-  
χοι πόρου, ἀνίχ' ἔξανεί-  
η δακέθυμος ἄτα.

705

Wakefield's emendation πόρου (*πόρον vel πόρων add.*) is not in doubt, but its meaning is. Does it mean 'supplies' ('resource' Jebb) or 'movement' (Webster)? Webster argues that the latter 'comes more naturally after εἰλυόμενος, and provisioning is dealt with in the next strophe' (707-7). He ignores, however, the ablative force of ὅθεν, which he translates 'In whatever directing' whereas it means 'from whatever direction'. If, as Webster desires, εὐμάρεια πόρου here meant 'ease of movement, an easy path' we would require not ὅθεν but οἷ: except in such contexts as mountaineering or descending to Hades, one normally thinks of a place as easy or hard to get to, not as easy or hard to get back from. Furthermore, for Philoctetes there is no such thing as an easy path: movement anywhere is difficult and painful.



No, when Philoctetes went out he did so for a reason. He went to those places whence there was available (δθεν ὑπάρχον) an abundance of supplies (εὐμάρεια πόρου) - not necessarily just food (which is first specifically mentioned at 707) but also, as Jebb saw, water, fuel and the pain-relieving plants of 698ff. For πόρος of material resources in poetry cf. Eur. Supp. 777, Ph. 984; Ar. Frogs 1465, Eccl. 653.

4) Oliver Taplin has acutely observed (*Greek Tragedy in Action*, London 1978, 112) that Philoctetes' attack of insanity in 814ff. is so presented that it seems to have been brought on by the touch of Neoptolemos' treacherous hand (813). Something of the same sort seems to be true of his attack of pain at 782ff.. He has already had a severe attack of his malady (732-756); he then explains, without any further sign of pain, that after such an attack he normally falls asleep (766-7). He gives the bow to Neoptolemos for safe keeping, and we then expect sleep to overcome him; but instead he suddenly has another attack. There is no obvious dramatic reason why our expectations should be cheated and the attack doubled; but we may observe that this recurrence of the physical malady, like the later mental malady, directly follows a moment of contact (in this case indirect) with Neoptolemos - the moment when Neoptolemos and Philoctetes each had a hand on the bow - and that this contact was accompanied by a treacherous promise (774-5) and an ambiguous and deceitful prayer (779-81) by Neoptolemos. Taplin rightly speaks of 'the contamination of [Neoptolemos'] deceit'; but if such moral pollution is like physical pollution, it can be transmitted by indirect as well as direct contact (so e.g. it was dangerous to share food or shelter with a person under blood pollution). Neoptolemos is defiled by his participation in Odysseus' foul scheme, and this moral sickness can create or aggravate sickness in anyone with whom he comes in contact.

Note that the double contact between Neoptolemos and Philoctetes (first indirectly via the bow, then directly) is repeated in 1287ff., when Neoptolemos first hands the bow back to Philoctetes and shortly afterwards takes hold of his hand (1300-1302) to restrain him from shooting Odysseus. By then, of course, Neoptolemos is no longer morally polluted, and contact with him no longer has any damaging effect.

5) Odysseus has intervened to prevent Neoptolemos from returning Philoctetes' bow to its owner, and now, abandoning Philoctetes to his fate, tells Neoptolemos to accompany him to the ship. Philoctetes implores the sailors that they at least should not desert him. They say they will do whatever Neoptolemos orders. So Neoptolemos - who has remained silent, the bow in his hands, for 100 lines - is at last forced to speak:

ἀκούσομαι μὲν ὥς ἔφυν οἴκτου πλέως  
 πρὸς τοῦδ'· ὅμως δὲ μέλαινα', εἰ τοῦτω δοκεῖ, 1075  
 χρόνον τοσοῦτον, εἰς ὅσον τὰ τῆς νεῆως  
 στείλωσι ναῦται καὶ θεοὶς εὐχόμεθα.

It has usually been supposed that τοῦδ' in 1075 refers to Odysseus and τοῦτω to Philoctetes. Webster, however, in his edition, and also M. Lacroix, *BCH* 100 (1976), 345, have argued that τοῦτω must be Odysseus because it is Odysseus, not Philoctetes, whose permission is required for the sailors to remain. This argument is based on a misunderstanding of the conversational formula εἰ τοῦτω δοκεῖ (or εἰ σοι δοκεῖ or simply εἰ δοκεῖ). This formula is not used to ask permission; its function is to take note of another party's earnest wish with which the speaker is complying, often somewhat reluctantly, and it means not 'If that's all right with you (him)' but 'if that's what you want (he wants)'. Barrett on Eur. Hipp. 507-8 analyses about thirty instances of the formula and finds that 'in every case where text and context are certain the apodosis indicates the speaker's willingness to acquiesce in a line of conduct which he conceives the other person to desire'; there were only four counter-examples, all dubious, and one of these (*Men. Mis.* 66 Körte = 264 Sandbach) has since vanished thanks to a new papyrus (*P. Oxy.* 2656). Barrett's analysis only covers cases where the dative expressed or understood with δοκεῖ is a second-person one, but Ar. Frogs 861, to which he also refers, shows that the formula's meaning is the same where the dative is third-person (and cf. εἰ θεοὶς δοκεῖ in Eur. *Hel.* 1683, *EL* 968; on the latter passage Denniston speaks very properly of Orestes' 'helpless resignation and despair' as he prepares to fulfil the apparent will of the gods).

Neoptolemos, then, is not asking for permission from Odysseus or from Philoctetes either. He is acquiescing in Philoctetes' obvious desire not to be left alone, and τοῦτω denotes Philoctetes (as οὗτος does in 1078 - I cannot imagine what makes Lacroix suppose the latter refers to Odysseus). There is no need to accept (with Webster) the clumsiness of τοῦδ' ... τοῦτω in quick succession referring to the same person, or (with Lacroix) the semantic contortions that become necessary if τοῦδ' is taken to denote Philoctetes.

Another word on the pronouns in this passage. Neoptolemos' embarrassment at the situation he finds himself in comes across strongly in the pronouns and verb-forms he uses. This is the only speech in the play in which Neoptolemos uses the first-person plural to refer to himself and Odysseus; and once he identifies himself even more closely with Odysseus' cause by using the first-person dual pronoun and the very rare first-person dual verb-form (νῶ μὲν οὖν ὁρμώμεθον 1079). Meanwhile Philoctetes is called οὗτος like an outsider, even an opponent. Neoptolemos, caught at 974 on the point of returning the bow to Philoctetes, visibly distressed (1011-12) at the part he has played in duping the sick man, now doing him a favour



which at best will earn him Odysseus' contempt, takes pains to choose his language so as to emphasize a solidarity with Odysseus that he can hardly feel. Hence likewise the attempt he makes to sound unsympathetic, cold, efficient: the men may remain with Philoctetes only till the ship is ready to sail (1076-7) and must then ὁρμᾶσθαι ταχεῖς (1080); and the object of their remaining is not to comfort Philoctetes but in the hope that φρόνησιν ... λάβοι λάω τιν' ἡμῶν (1078-9). Forced at last to break silence, Neoptolemos finds this uneasy compromise between disloyalty to Odysseus and heartlessness to Philoctetes; but the very fact of his allowing the sailors to remain shows clearly enough where his real feelings lie.

6) O.T. 603-4

καὶ τῶνδ' ἔλεγχον τοῦτο μὲν πυθᾶδ' ὦν  
πεύθου τὰ χρησθέντ', εἰ σαφὲς ἤγγειλά σοι.

'A direct and reasonable challenge that would at once have proved [Oedipus] wrong' (Kitto, *Greek Tragedy*, 1961, 176-7). So it will seem to the chorus and the audience, who believe in Kreon's innocence. But what will the audience expect Oedipus to make of it? He has convinced himself, on quite plausible evidence, that Kreon is determined, by hook or by crook, to bring about his (Oedipus') death or exile and to usurp the throne for himself. What can he be expected to think when this traitor now proposes that Oedipus forthwith leave Thebes for at least several days? What else than that this is a ruse to get him out of the way while Kreon uses his popularity (596-7) to seize the throne in Oedipus' absence?

Another consideration may also occur to the hearer. Laios, so Oedipus has been told, was killed by robbers while on a journey - robbers who, he at once deduces, must have been the hired agents of some plotter or plotters in Thebes (122-5). The robbers have never been caught, the plotters never identified, and it is to be apprehended that the same men may make an attempt on Oedipus' own life (139-140). At one point Oedipus charges Teiresias with having been behind the murder (346-8); now Teiresias, as he believes, is plotting with Kreon against himself (378-9, 399-402, 572-3). If Theban plotters could suborn bandits once to commit a murder for them, they could do so twice: what then could be more foolish than for Oedipus to go on a journey by road at Kreon's suggestion? He would stand a very good chance of never reaching his destination, any more than Laios did.

Accordingly this couplet - the only part of Kreon's defence speech in which he comes close to offering actual evidence of his innocence - is almost bound to produce, in the mind of a judge convinced of Kreon's guilt, an effect opposite to that intended: to make him all the more certain that Kreon is an astute and desperate criminal who will stop at nothing to secure his ends. No wonder the immediate reaction of Oedipus to the speech is to brush aside the chorus-leader's warning to proceed cautiously with the words 'The plotter is acting swiftly and stealthily, and I must act quickly too; if I wait and do nothing, he will already have achieved his ends' (618-620). What Oedipus sees, we realize, through the distorting lens of his preconceived certainty, is that Kreon, far from being disconcerted by the charge of treason, has at once turned it to his own advantage by hitting on a seemingly fair proposal that, if accepted, will put Oedipus at his mercy. It is far too dangerous to allow such a man to live, even in exile; the only safe course is to put him to death forthwith (623). And so precisely by the challenge whereby he hoped to establish his innocence, Kreon has sealed his doom, or would have done had not his sister intervened. Presently we shall see the same pattern repeated in matters of greater moment. Iokaste tries to convince Oedipus that the statements of prophets like Teiresias cannot be relied on - and succeeds in almost convincing him that Teiresias was telling the truth. The messenger from Corinth tries to reassure him that he is in no danger of marrying his mother - and in doing so makes it plain to Iokaste that that is precisely what he has done. And above all there is the instance of Oedipus himself, turning his back on Corinth in order not to meet his parents, and as a result meeting them. Over and over in the play, well-meant actions achieve the opposite of their intended effect; and Kreon's well-meant challenge is one of them.

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D. BRAUND (Exeter): *Cicero and the Greek East: Antiochus I and Ariobarzanes III*

LCM 7.3 (Mar. 1982), 37-39

*My thanks are due to Joyce Reynolds: shortcomings to myself.*

In LCM 6.7 (July 1971), 183-4, M.M. Willcock seeks to elucidate Cicero's humour at Q. fr. 2.11 (10).2-3. He suggests that Cicero is punning on Zeugma, the town, and zeugma, the rhetorical device. There can be little doubt that Cicero is capable of such a pun, but Willcock's case for it here seems unconvincing. As he observes, 'zeugma in the ancient grammarians ... is ... the understanding of the same verb with more than one phrase or object'. However, the phrase in which he would detect the zeugma and thus the pun, *qui tibusrenum praetextatum non ferebatis, Commagenum feretis?*, does not seem properly to contain the device, as Willcock himself largely allows. Moreover, even if it did, the zeugma is not presented in the quoted portion of the speech in such a way as to bring the house down.

The leading interpretation of Cicero's joke remains that of D.R. Shackleton Bailey, first



advanced in *JRS* 45(1955), 36, and recently developed in his edition of 1980 at pp.192-3 (to the literature there mentioned add now Willcock, and also W.S.Watt, *LCM* 6.4[Apr.1981], 93, and G.L.Huxley, *LCM* 6.8[Oct.1981], 219). His interpretation is plausible enough, and I have little to put in its place, but would even so offer some cautionary observations. He suggests that for *Busrenunt* we read *Burrunum*. This man may be the urban praetor of 83 B.C., or perhaps his son, named Burrienus or Burrenus. On this view Cicero is here alluding to senatorial/aristocratic hostility to the occupation of a curule magistracy by the apparently low-born Burrenus. The joke, it is argued, arises from a vegetable pun on both Burrenus and Commagenus, the former being the name of a herb and the latter being that of a concoction of the herb commagene.

If this is correct, as it may be, we should observe Cicero's cheek: a *novus homo* called Chick-pea was hardly in the best position to crack vegetable puns at the expense of the low-born. However, one wonders whether such a recondite pun would really have the senators rolling in the aisles. Commagenus was certainly a potion well-known to the learned Elder Pliny, but the best authority for *burrhinon* - in fact the only one I have found - is Pseudo-Apuleius. Moreover, even in Ps.-Apuleius, it is neither the principal nor, it seems, the Roman name of the herb: *Graeci cynocephalon dicunt ... alii bucranion, alii burrhinon ... Italicis canis cerebrum* (Herb.89). In addition, though we may guess, we know nothing of the hostility to which Cicero alludes. It seems unlikely that the allusion should be to the urban praetor of 83, almost thirty years before the speech. Of any son we know nothing - not even that he existed. Shackleton Bailey's case is ingenious, but, to the present writer, not quite satisfactory: it seems wiser to admit our ignorance and retain Watt's obelisks (*OCT*), or, possibly, to accept Huxley's *Oerhoenum*.

Indeed, it cannot be taken entirely for granted that Cicero's joke resides in the corrupted name alone, or even at all. The many meanings of *ferre* might contain a pun, while Willcock suggests that Cicero might be playing on the double-meaning of *praetextatus*, which can mean 'obscene'. Some support for this last might be gleaned from Juvenal, *Sat.* 2.170, where Armenian *pueri*, imbued with ways which are both Roman and morally corrupt, *sic praetextatos referunt Artaxata mores*. To unleash another hare, it could also be that Cicero was making some pun on *birrus* (*byrrus*, *byrrhus*), a short hooded cloak. The number and variety of possibilities only goes to underline our uncertainty.

All this apart, the broad tenor of Cicero's dealings with Antiochus in February 54 B.C. is clear enough: Cicero speaks against the king with (he claims) devastating effect. This is the earliest but not the only evidence of contact between Cicero and Antiochus. As governor of Cilicia in 51, Cicero writes to the Senate:

*regis Antiochi Commageni legati primi mihi nuntiarunt Parthorum magnas copias Euphratem transire coepisse. quo nuntio adlato, cum essent non nulli qui ei regi minorem fidem habendam putarent, statui exspectandum esse si quid certius adferretur.* Fam.15. .

In a contemporary letter, Cicero seems to include Antiochus among those kings *qui, etiam si sunt amici nobis, tamen aperte Parthis inimici esse non audent* (Fam.15.4.4). There is little here to suggest that relations between Cicero and Antiochus had taken a turn for the better.

One may reasonably be surprised, therefore, to read that Cicero had established a friendly relationship with Antiochus in 51 (so R.J.Rowland Jr., 'Cicero and the Greek World', *TAPA* 203[1972], 457; for Antiochus II read Antiochus I: R.D.Sullivan, 'The Dynasty of Commagene', *ANRW* 11.8[1978], 768, seems to take a similar line, listing Cicero among Antiochus' Roman friends).

This brings us full circle to the text of a letter of Cicero, more precisely to a fragment of a letter to Pansa. In this letter (*Ep.fr.* 5.1), Cicero expresses the long-standing mutual affection obtaining between himself and an individual whose name is corrupt:

Nonius p.509M. = 819L., 14: '*humaniter*'. *M.Tullius ad Pansam lib.I: de Antio fecisti humaniter; quem quidem ego semper dilexi meque ab eo diligi sensi.* - Priscianus 15.13 (*GL* 3 p.70.13 Kell): *idem [sc. Cicero] ad Pansam I: de Antiocho fecisti humaniter.*

Reading *Antiocho*, it is argued that Cicero here expresses his affection for Antiochus I of Commagene. It is this reading which has encouraged belief in a reconciliation between the two in 51. But without independent support the argument is circular: the interpretation of the fragment is made plausible by their good relations, while their good relations are attested only by the interpretation. Moreover Cicero's *semper* must count against the interpretation, particularly if we date the fragment as early as 47/6 B.C. (Rowland, loc.cit.). Further, even if *Antiocho* is read - and it seems quite plausible - the Antiochus in question need not be the king of Commagene, for the name is common enough: indeed, one wonders what a governor of Bithynia (as Pansa is taken to be at the time of this letter) might have to do with the king of Commagene, at the other end of Asia Minor (on the history of Antiochus I after Caesar's victory see Sullivan, loc.cit.: that Antiochus and Cicero both supported Pompey - the former with no great commitment - tells us nothing of the state of affairs between the two men). On the present argument, therefore, there is no good reason to suppose any reconciliation between Cicero and Antiochus in 51.



2. Cicero tells us that the Senate recognized Ariobarzanes III, king of Cappadocia, without his having formally requested it to do so (this must be the meaning of *Fam.15.2.8 regem, quem vos honorificentissime appellassetis nullo postulante* [so Shackleton Bailey ad loc.], despite P.C.Sands, *The Client Princes of the Roman Empire under the Republic*, 1908, 69-70 with 205: the position of R.D.Sullivan, *ANRW* 11.7.2[1980], 1140, is not explicit: for *postulare* in this sense see Cicero, *Sest.56*, and Caesar, *BG* 1.43.5, both in the context of recognition). The purpose of this discussion is to establish which senator proposed his recognition. Until recently there has been no doubt: it was Cicero (see e.g. Sands and Sullivan locc. cit.). But it has now been suggested that the king's sponsor was Cato, not Cicero, and that Cicero's part was only the conveyance of the title to the king (Shackleton Bailey ad loc. & 460-1: Rowland, *TAPA* 103[1972], 457, seems to take a similar view).

The text upon which this view of Cato's role depends is *Fam.15.4.6*:

*cum autem ad Cybistra propter rationem belli quinque dies essem moratus, regem Ariobarzanem, cuius salutem a senatu te auctore commendatam habebam, praesentibus insidiis necopinantem liberavi neque solum ei saluti fui sed etiam curavi ut cum auctoritate regnaret.*

The addressee is Cato: Cicero is saying that the Senate entrusted him with the safety of Ariobarzanes at the instigation of Cato.

This passage must be set beside *Fam.2.17.7*:

*illud vero pusilli animi et in ipsa malevolentia ieiuni atque inanis, quod Ariobarzanem, quia senatus per me regem appellavit mihi commendavit, iste (sc. Bibulus) non regem, sed regis Ariobarzanis filium appellat.*

Shackleton Bailey (ad loc.) argues that this cannot mean that Cicero proposed Ariobarzanes' recognition, since that would contradict *Fam.15.4.6*, quoted above, where Cato is said to have been responsible for it.

But the contradiction is not there. In our first letter, Cicero does not say that Cato proposed Ariobarzanes' recognition, only that the king's safety be entrusted to Cicero. There seems, therefore, to be no obstacle to the traditional interpretation, according to which Cicero proposed the recognition. In any case, the traditional view fits the details better. Bibulus' refusal to allow the king his royal title through hostility to Cicero makes more sense if Cicero were the proposer of this royal title and not merely its conveyor. Further, other uses of *per* in the context of recognition of kings in Cicero tend to bear this out. We may compare *Har.resp.29*, where Cicero's attitude to the recognition of Brogitarus (exceptionally by plebscite) is markedly similar to the behaviour of Bibulus to which he takes such objection (note also, in a slightly different context, *Att.14.12.1*).

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T.E.KINSEY(Glasgow): *The political insignificance of Cicero's pro Roscio*

LCM 7.3(Mar.1982), 39-40

R.J.Seager, *LCM* 7.1(Jan.1982), 10-12, argues that in the *pro Roscio* 'Cicero has quite consciously manufactured for himself the opportunity to deliver a political manifesto'. The obvious objection to this thesis, which Seager mentions at the end of his article but does not satisfactorily meet, is what would have been the point of a political manifesto from someone as obscure as Cicero then was, still four years away from even the quaestorship. Before Cicero is convicted of such ineptitude it is necessary to show that there is matter in the speech which cannot, in the context of Cicero's career, rhetorical training and the circumstances of the case, be more plausibly explained. It is failure to consider context that vitiates Seager's article. The sincerity or otherwise of some of Cicero's views in the *pro Roscio* is not at issue, but only his probable reason for expressing them there. I shall be brief since I have already argued some of the relevant points in *AC* 49(1980), 173ff..

1. 'Cicero insists from the outset that the case of Roscius is a political one' (Seager, p.10). Cicero's attempt to give his case a general importance can be explained in rhetorical terms; cf. *de inv.*1.23 *attentos autem faciemus si demonstrabimus ea quae dicturi erimus magna, nova, incredibilia esse, aut ad omnes aut ad eos qui audient, aut ad aliquos illustres aut ad deos immortales aut ad summam rem publicam pertinere*, and 101 *tertius locus per quem quaerimus quidnam sit eventurum si idem ceteri faciant; et simul ostendimus, huic si concessum sit, multos aemulos eiusdem audaciae futuros; ex eo quid mali sit eventurum demonstrabimus*. Is Cicero doing more than employing rhetorical devices he had himself recommended only a short time before? He would be particularly likely to do so at the outset of his career if he had to struggle for an audience. See *AC* 49(1980), 185-8.

2. The criticism of Sulla in the *pro Roscio* may be even less than Seager allows. (i) To say the property of Roscius was bought from Sulla (6) need only mean that the sale was properly carried out; cf. *Quinct.76 emisti bona Sex.Alfeni L.Sulla dictatore vendente*. (ii) In 146, when Chrysogonus is told to put his hope in *eis rebus quas L.Sul'a gessit* Cicero is referring, as Seager opines, to Sulla's general arrangements for the proscriptions. Since Roscius was not going to claim his property back (144-5), Chrysogonus would only lose it if the general arrangements were disturbed (cf.145). (iii) There is no 'certain criticism' of Sulla



in 22 and 131. Stress is there being laid not so much on his power as on the multitude of the responsibilities which he alone carries, in order to excuse his lapses of attention; otherwise the argument will not work. The words *cum solus rem publicam regeret orbemque terrarum gubernaret* need not indicate disapproval; cf. *de or.* 1.8 *iam vero consilio ac sapientia qui regere et gubernare rem publicam possent, multi nostra, plures patrum memoria exstiterunt.*

3. It is not surprising that Cicero attacks Chrysogonus since he is allegedly behind the prosecution and therefore has to be discredited.

4. Much is said in the speech about the lawlessness of the times, again not surprisingly. Roscius' case was the first to come before the courts for a long time (11) and, according to Cicero, it was expected that the jury would want to make an example (28). What Cicero does is to turn the law and order argument to his own advantage. It is those behind the prosecution who have been guilty of lawlessness. The jurors must make a stand for law and order by acquitting, not condemning, Roscius (12-13).

5. As for Cicero's 'discreet disapproval' of the proscriptions, in 153 he says that the Senate had disapproved of Sulla's proscriptions, and the jurors should take care that they are not used to inaugurate a proscription of a newer and much crueller kind. The 'discreet disapproval' is merely implied by yet another argument for the acquittal of Roscius. It would have a particular appeal to the jurors, who were senators.

6. The *nobiles*, Cicero says (135), *tametsi meo iure possum, si quod in hac parte mihi non placeat, vituperare; non enim vereor ne quis alienum me animum habuisse a causa nobilitatis existimet.* However, a statement of his political position is then given (136-7), presumably in case his lecture to the *nobiles*, which follows, should be misunderstood. There is nothing in this lecture which cannot be taken as an attempt to secure an acquittal, since the jury would consist partly, if not wholly, of *nobiles*; Cicero says (8) that it was specially chosen for its *severitas*. The picture which Cicero paints at the beginning of the speech, of the *nobiles* sitting in silent fear, provides a dramatic opening, but it is doubtful whether it corresponds to reality (AC 49[1980], 183-7), and the *nobiles* can hardly be accused of leaving Roscius in the lurch (Seager p.11); they had taken him in (27) and provided him with counsel (4) and *advocati* (1), sufficient aid in fact to obtain his acquittal. Cicero in this speech poses as the underdog and to this end it suits him to stress the alleged resourcelessness of Roscius, but the *nobiles* can hardly be blamed for not doing more than proved necessary. It is true they do not appear to have backed a claim for the restoration of his property, but that might have been impolitic and unsuccessful (AC 182).

7. *Praise of traditional values.* According to the prosecutor, Erucius, Roscius' father had banished his son to the country (42). Cicero replies that the son had in fact been put in charge of the family estates (44). This was an honour, and Cicero goes on to illustrate the high regard in which a rural mode of life had always been held. Praise of rustic life therefore forms a natural part of his refutation of Erucius. Similarly with *mandatum*. Since Cicero accuses Capito of violating a *mandatum* (114-115), observations on the sanctity of that institution are not out of place.

It may be objected that all that has been shown is that Cicero's manifesto has been skilfully integrated into his speech, but that surely is enough. Cicero had no good reason for delivering a manifesto. Those passages in his speech which are said to form parts of one can be explained on other grounds. What reason is left for saying they do form one? It might also be asked why, if he was intent on a political manifesto, he did not contrive to bring into it subjects of more pressing concern than e.g. the sanctity of mandate. Had then Cicero any other object in this speech than the obvious one of winning the verdict? At the beginning of the *de imperio* (1-2) Cicero tells his audience he has not hitherto spoken from the *rostra*. He goes on: *omne meum tempus amicorum temporibus transmittendum putavi. ita neque hic locus vacuus unquam fuit ab eis qui vestram causam defenderent, et meus labor, in privatorum periculis caste interreque versatus, ex vestris iudiciis fructum est amplissimum consecutus.* It would seem from this that Cicero had successfully pursued a policy of obtaining political support in return for his efforts in the courts. The pursuance of such a policy depended on defendants being willing to entrust their cases to him. Before the year 80 Cicero had only appeared in civil cases. What Cicero's career needed at this point was not a political manifesto but a demonstration of ability as a criminal lawyer. In the *pro Roscio* Cicero provided one to such good effect that he was overwhelmed by cases, his health suffered, and he had to go abroad to recuperate (*Brut.* 312ff.). Roscius' case was probably an easy one to win (AC 49, 189-90). The length and elaboration of Cicero's speech can plausibly be ascribed to his determination to make it into a show-case for his oratorical wares.



It may be a consequence of the - altogether legitimate - fascination exercised upon scholars by the style and theology of Apuleius that his extremely subtle techniques of allusion and reminiscence have lately received a little less than their due<sup>1</sup>. This note aims to draw attention to a striking example early in the Cupid and Psyche episode, where the honour paid to Psyche's beauty *verae Veneris vehementer incendit animos* (iv.29.5). J. Tatum, *Apuleius and the Golden Ass*, Cornell 1979, 49, calls the passage a 'thematic reworking' of *Aeneid* 1.34ff., and indeed the sequence - indignant goddess laments failed power and diminished honours (cf. notably *Aen.* 1.48-9

*et quisquam numen Iunonis adorat*

*praeterea aut supplex aris imponit honorem?*) - resorts to subaltern deity - appeals for help - secures help - is shared by the two passages [of which it occurs to the Editor that the ultimate source is the *Διὸς ἑνάτην*, *Iliad* 14.153-291]. But Apuleius of course expects in his readers a perfect knowledge of the *Aeneid* and points them specifically to a related passage where the same sequence recurs with a vaster and more sinister outcome: Venus (ibid.) *inpatiens indignationis capite quassanti fremens altius sic secum disserit*. Cf. *Aen.* 7.292

*tum quassans caput haec effundit pectore dicta*, a verbal parallelism noted by (e.g.) L.C. Purser, *The Story of Cupid and Psyche*, London 1910, ad loc., who is not concerned to draw further inferences. Juno visits Aeolus but summons Allecto, as Venus does her son. Apuleius' general characterization (iv.30.4 *malis suis moribus contempta disciplina publica*) followed by a reference to Cupid's weapons (*flammis et sagittis armatus*) evokes the sequence *Aen.* 7.324-6, 329, 336-7. Whereas Aeolus, bribed with the hope of a nymph, obeys orders, Allecto's very nature fits her perfectly for the task; thus Venus, *quantum genuina licentia procacem, verbis quoque insuper stimulat*. So we have been told (*Aen.* 7.325) that *tristia bella* are dear to Allecto, but Juno *his acuit verbis* (330) her assistant. The reader who has followed Apuleius attentively thus far may be prompted to anticipate the vast dimensions of Psyche's future suffering<sup>2</sup>.

Venus' first explosion of indignation is, within a Virgilian context, verbally Lucretian (P.G. Walsh, *The Roman Novel*, Cambridge 1970, 55): Apuleius, like Nabokov, believes in keeping his readers busy: iv.30.1 *en rerum naturae prisca parens, en elementorum origo initialis, en orbis totius alma Venus*. This recollection of Lucretius' title and language also confirms strikingly the correctness of Kenney's suggestion that the sense of 'bringing things to birth' is strongly present at Lucretius 1.21

*quae quoniam rerum naturam sola gubernas*<sup>3</sup>. Apuleius explicitly evokes the connexion of the Lucretian Venus with universal generation. That is not quite all: G.F. Hildebrand, ad loc. (Leipzig 1842), recognizing that the genitive *orbis totius alma Venus* required explanation, claimed that *alma* was used in the sense of *altrix* or *alumnatrix*. Purser reproved him for citing no parallels. But if Kenney's proposal is right, then the *alma Venus* of Lucretius 1.2 is certainly an instance of *almus* being used in the sense of *qui alit*<sup>4</sup>, and the Lucretian passage lends some specific support to Hildebrand's perfectly credible explanation of the genitive<sup>5</sup>.

1. Cf. the terse and excellent remarks of P.G. Walsh, *The Roman Novel*, Cambridge 1970, 52ff..
2. And cf. Walsh 53: the evocation of Aeschylus' Io by Psyche prompts further connexions between Hera/Juno and Apuleius' Venus.
3. Lucretius (*GR Survey* xi, 1977), 14.
4. The poets regularly show awareness of the connexions of *almus* and *alo*; cf. Lucretius 2.992, Virgil, *G.* 2.330 & *Aen.* 7.664.
5. My thanks are due to Miss Georgina Robinson, whose lively interest prompted a renewed study of Cupid and Psyche.

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D.S. BARRETT (Queensland): *Cicero*, Philippic 13.11.24

LCM 7.3 (Mar. 1982), 41-42

*ex quo te tua uirtus prouexisset, ex quo genus? in lustris, popinis, alea, uino tempus aetatis omne consumpsisses, ut faciebas, cum in gremio mimarum mentum mentemque deponeres*. So the Budé text of P. Willeumier (1960). Halm's reading (after Ferrarius) of *mentum mentemque* rather than the MSS. *mentem mentumque* is well defended by J.R. King (1878) ad loc..

Translators have gone to some pains to echo the alliteration of this phrase, if only in a hit-and-miss way. So Walter C.A. Ker in the Loeb (1926): '... when you deposited your beard - and your wits - in the bosoms of actresses'; and the Budé: '... quand tu déposais ton corps et ton cœur dans le giron des comédiennes'.

Of course *corps* is quite inaccurate for *mentum*, but what of Ker's 'beard'? And can 'bosoms' be right for *gremio*? In other words, what is Antony putting where?

While the point is somewhat pedantic, Jocelyn Toynbee (in *Roman historical portraits*, Ithaca 1978, 41) shows from numismatic evidence that Antony wore a beard only from Julius Caesar's death in 44 B.C. till the battle of Philippi in 42 B.C.. Cicero is referring to an earlier period.



42 earlier period.

*gremium* literally means 'bosom, lap' and, by metonymy, the female genital parts. The *Oxford Latin Dictionary* cites six examples of this use of *gremium*, including Cicero, *Sen. 51 cum [terra] gremio molito ... sparsum semen excepit*. Terence, *Eun. 584-4*, might well be added. It seems not unlikely that Antony is here depicted as a *cunnuliggeter*, *mentemque*, which some commentators have found awkward, suggests moreover that he was obsessed with these delights, a veritable Cupiennius (Horace, *Sat. 1.2.36*). This interpretation is reinforced possibly by the liaison of *cum* and *in* (cf. Cicero on *cum nos in Fam. 9.22.2*) and certainly by the exuberant and expressive alliteration of *m* throughout the clause. The device is at least as striking as in the famous *potius paratum nobis et perfugium putemus* (*Tusc. 1.49.118*). It is striking too when we recall that orators are warned in *Rhet. Her. 4.12.18* to avoid using it to excess.

It may be objected that this sort of thing was too indecent for Cicero to write about, especially in view of *Phil. 2.47: sunt quaedam, quae honeste non possum dicere; tu autem eo liberior, quod ea in te admisisti, quae a uerecundo inimico audere posses*. But Cicero makes this show of modesty in the same book in which he has already portrayed Antony first as a teenage prostitute and then as Curio's paid and very willing bed partner (*Phil. 2.44-45*). Shortly after his disclaimer, he accuses Antony of travelling through Italy with a wagonload of pimps (58) and vomiting food scraps over himself and a public platform (63). Then he calls Antony *Catamitum* (77).

While there are no 'vulgar' words, there is no shrinking either, which is roughly consistent with the *uerecundia* Cicero playfully ascribes to himself in *Fam. 9.22*. After 'demonstrating' that *turpitudinem nec in uerba esse nec in re, itaque nusquam esse* (22.3), he concludes (somewhat illogically?) *ego seruo et seruabo (sic enim adsuevi) Platonis uerecundiam. itaque tectis uerbis ea ad te scripsi, quae apertissimis agunt Stoici* (22.5). *gremiis* then could be regarded as a *tectum uerbum*, and the clause translated 'when you lowered mouth and mind into the laps of your actresses'.

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HOWARD JACOBSON (Illinois): A philosophical topos at Vergil, *Eclogues 6.37-8*

LCM 7.3 (Mar. 1982), 42

Commentators justifiably devote themselves to explicating the cosmogony of vv. 31-40 and to finding appropriate parallels and possible sources. But they have failed to notice that a common philosophical topos underlies the peculiar expression at 37-8, *iamque novum terrae stupeant lucescere solem* | *altius*. In discussion about God and particularly in the use of the teleological argument it was evidently common to imagine how an individual who had never seen the sun would react upon seeing it for the first time (with wonder and amazement, of course). Cicero transmits a passage from Aristotle (*ND 2.95*): *si essent qui sub terra semper habitavissent ... nec tamen exissent unquam supra terram ... deinde aliquo tempore patefactis terrae faucibus ex illis abditis sedibus exire potuissent atque evadere in haec loca quae nos incolimus, cum repente terram et maria caelumque vidissent ... aspexissentque solem eiusque cum magnitudinem pulchritudinemque, tum etiam efficientiam cognovissent ... quae cum viderent, profecto et esse deos et haec tanta opera deorum esse arbitrarentur*.

Philo utilizes the same idea (*Praem. 41-2*): *ὅπερ γὰρ εἰς εὐνομον πόλιν τόνδε τὸν κόσμον παρελθόντες καὶ θεασάμενοι γῆν μὲν ἐστῶσαν ὀρεινὴν καὶ πεδιάδα ... ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ἥλιον καὶ σελήνην πλάνητάς τε καὶ ἀπλανεῖς ἀστέρας καὶ τὸν σύμπαντα οὐρανὸν ἐν τάξει μετὰ τῆς οἰκίας στρατιᾶς ἡρμοσμένον, κόσμον ἀληθινὸν ἐν κόσμῳ περιπολοῦντα, θαυμάσαντες καὶ καταπλαγέντες εἰς ἔννοιαν ἤλθον ἀκόλουθον τοῖς φανέσιν ...*. Similarly Seneca writes (*ad Marciam de consol. 18.1ff*): *puta nascenti me tibi venire in consilium: intraturus es urbem dis, hominibus communem, omnia complexam ... videbis uno sidere omnia impleri, solem cotidiano cursu diei noctisque spatia signantem ... miraberis etc.*. Interestingly, Lucretius in Book Two of the *de rerum natura* (a book whose influence on the cosmogony of *Eclogue 6* is often obvious) turns this theme ingeniously to his own purpose (2.1030-37):

*principio caeli clarum purumque colorem  
quaeque in se cohibet, palantia sidera passim  
lunamque et solis praeclara luce nitorem,  
omnia quae nunc si primum mortalibus extant,  
ex improviso si sint obiecta repente,  
quid magis his rebus poterat mirabile dici,  
aut minus ante quod auderent fore credere gentes?  
nihil, ut opinor. ita haec species miranda fuisset.*

Thus, what is traditionally a hypothetical argument in philosophical discourse has imaginatively been turned by Vergil into a primeval 'historical' event - the earth itself marvels when for the first time it sees the newly created sun.

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Review: A.C.LLOYD(Liverpool)

LCM 7.3(Mar.1982), 43 43

H.J.Blumenthal & R.A.Markus, edd., *Neoplatonism and early Christian thought: essays in honour of A.H.Armstrong*, London, Variorum Publications, 1981; pp.x + 256; £18, cloth.  
ISBN 0-86078-085-6

Hilary Armstrong was Professor of Greek at the University of Liverpool from 1950-1972. During this time he published more than half of the articles which he later selected for *Plotinian and Christian studies* (Variorum Reprints 1979) and saw the first three volumes of his Loeb Plotinus through the press. It is therefore fitting as well as pleasing that two former Liverpool colleagues of his should have edited a volume of 'Essays in his honour'. (And Armstrong would be the first to acknowledge the stimulus which he owed to the fact that each of them was active in one of his, Armstrong's, two chief scholarly interests.) The authors of these essays have interpreted their tasks in varying ways and, what may be a little disconcerting a few readers - but perhaps only a few - have assessed their audience in varying ways. Two hundred and fifty large print pages between nineteen contributors don't of course allow them much scope. Some of the essays are in fact rather light in content. There are some, on Plotinus in particular, which assume a knowledge of texts and do tackle problems: D.O'Brien for example on a controversy over one of the *Enneads*' references to the origin of matter, J.Igal on a controversy over Porphyry's reference to the Gnostics in Plotinus's circle. At the other extreme M.T.Clark writes so broadly in favour of a *theologia perennis* in Plotinus, the Anonymus Taurensis and Marius Victorinus that her failure to acknowledge the difficulties will be in danger of misleading the uninitiated and annoying the initiated. By and large the latter are likely to find the papers that deal with particular points of Stoicism or Neoplatonism the most interesting; and it may help to give them an impression of the volume if I pick out a few of the details which seemed to me to invite comment.

*Ennead* IV 8,6 argues that goodness extends as far as matter whether matter has (a) 'always existed' or (b) its 'generation followed necessarily from causes prior to it'. Adding to a long standing debate O'Brien argues that (a) alludes to the generation of matter from the One, (b) to its generation only from soul. He argues this plausibly although the argument would have been better without the assumption that either (a) or (b) must have been Plotinus's own belief (as (b) will be of course on O'Brien's interpretation). Smith has usefully collected cases of potentiality at the level of *Nous* to see how far they can be explained (in fact not very far) by the context of a metaphor such as that of seeds. What makes for a problem is Plotinus's willingness to say of a whole and its parts that *each* is related to the other as potential to actual. Smith has not chosen to probe in any depth: but he has gone on to draw to our attention *In Parm.* p.751 where Proclus's rejection of the identity of a whole and its parts seems to be a rejection of the Plotinian-Stoic model. P.Hadot expounds with much sensitivity Plotinus's use of the myth of Ouranos, Kronos and Zeus. A small point here: ought τῆς πρὸς τὸ ἄνω ἀποτομῆς at V 8,13.8 to be translated 'castration' or 'mutilation' which Plotinus would surely be averse from attributing to the One? He is not using the literal language of the myth (such as 'swallowing') in this tract; and a regular though negative use of ἀποτομή of the Good (I 7,1.27; cf. VI 2,22.34 & 4,9.90) follows, I suspect, Aristotle, *Phy.* III 202b7.

G.P.O'Daly has compared features of Augustine's account of time with features of the Stoic and Aristotelian accounts. But while his paper repays study I think that he sees more Stoicism in Augustine than is there. For example, Augustine does not really give us any reason for supposing that he accepts what according to O'Daly (very likely correctly) is the Stoic version of 'praesens de futuris'. When we predict the sunrise from the dawn (*Conf.* XI xviii 24) what is present about the significatum (the sunrise) in Augustine's account is the concepts or the images by means of which we talk of or 'see' the sunrise; the sunrise itself is future, not something present, because it is *tensed*, in the Stoic manner, as something which *is* going-to-be. About J.M.Rist's study of Stoic logic in the *Contra Celsum* the brief comment must be that he had an off day when he wrote it. (To mention the most disturbing of the errors on which more depends, we read that 'If it rains I get wet; if it rains I do not get wet; therefore it does not rain' is 'obviously fallacious'.)

R.T.Wallis has chosen an enormous subject, divine knowledge of particulars according to Plotinus, Proclus and Aquinas. But I think that even those who were already at home in it will find what he has written interesting as well as profitable reading. This is because he has taken the trouble to have a theme, the logical connexion which he believes to hold between a restriction of divine knowledge and a restriction of the reality of lower levels of objects. His paper also contains a lot of information. But there seems to be an indiscriminancy in his use of 'contingency', as between the negation of causal determinism and the negation of logical necessity, which may account for his puzzling assertion that there is no room for contingency in Neoplatonism.

Contributors whom I have not already named are as follows (under the editors' section headings) R.J.O'Connell, P.G.Walsh, H.Dörrie, J.Whittaker, C.J.De Vogel ('Platonism and Christianity before Plotinus'); D.Russell, R.D.Crouse ('St. Augustine and his Neoplatonic background'); E.L.Fortin, R.A.Markus, H.J.Blumenthal, W.Beierwaltes (Later Neoplatonism and the Christian tradition').



R. Blockley, *Ammianus Marcellinus, a selection, with introduction, notes and commentary*. Bristol Classical Press, 1980. Pp. xxviii + 139, paper, £4.95. ISBN 0-906515-07-6

To make any part of Ammianus' work more readily available to students is meritorious, and the present selection, though small, is in the main well chosen: his best ethnographical and battle pieces, important usurpation and trial sequences, Constantius' *adventus* in Rome, Julian's death, an urban *seditio* and some provincial troubles. Only with the last choice might disagreement be voiced: the account of upheavals in Africa is surely much better written and more interesting than that of the disturbances in Britain. However, it is hard to be sure for what kind of students this book is intended. The presentation of selections suggests Latinists, yet the commentary is almost exclusively historical.

Another general doubt concerns the text. B. has not unreasonably filled up all possible lacunae, but very few of these are signalled in the notes, and there is no apparatus. The unwary reader might therefore suppose that lacunae exist only where the supplements are justified in the notes, which would be very far from the truth. A few more specific textual points merit notice. 15.5.15 *occideretur*: of three parallels cited, 25.6.3 is a false reference, in 29.5.3 *indemnatus* is an unwarranted emendation. In the present passage V has ...*ar-*  
*etur*. 15.5.25: the defence of *flebilis* is not convincing. *flexibilis* accords better with *uerteretur*, despite the contents of 28. It was a question of matching Silvanus' changing moods, cf. *uariis adstanti figmentis*. 27.3.9: *adlenimenta*: according to Seyfarth this, and not *ad lenimenta*, is the reading of V; Clark, however, agrees with B.. 31.13.10: B. makes a good case for *linquente*.

The general introduction, the introduction to specific selections and the historical notes are for the most part admirable. 15.5.9: good note on *Ursinicum* ... *aboleri*. 16.10.2: good note on Constantius' strategy. 16.10.16: good note on *stabulum*. 20.4.18: not enough on the *torques* and allied problems. 20.4.22: reference should be made to the point at which Julian started to wear a proper diadem (21.1.4). 27.8, 28.3: B. retails the common but to my mind erroneous view that Ammianus' judgement of Theodosius' performance in Africa is flattering to the point of panegyric, yet fails to call attention to the plethora of panegyric language to be found in the much briefer narrative of Theodosius' stay in Britain. Only *tripudiantes* in 28.3.9 is singled out. Mention should also have been made of 27.8.8: *restituta, salus, recreata*, 28.3.2: *restituit*, 7: *instaurabat, recuperatam*, 9: *victoriis* ... *salutaribus*. 27.8.8: the equation of 'independent command' and *imperium* is not happy. 31.2: B. is commendably sceptical about romantic notions of the Hun cavalry somewhat paradoxically ushering in the age of chivalry at Edirne. 31.2.8: B.'s explanation of this passage is surely right. 31.12.10: it might have been made clearer that the decision to fight was Valens' own, merely reinforced by the arguments of his flatterers, cf. 7: *funesta principis destinatio*. 31.12.11: the contrast with Julian's behaviour before Strasbourg is well brought out. 31.12.15: good note on Roman willingness to negotiate.

The major weakness is in the treatment, or rather almost total lack of treatment, of Ammianus' political and moral attitudes and beliefs. Two excerpts deal with usurpation, yet there is virtually nothing about Ammianus' views on imperial power, legitimacy, or the duties and responsibilities of the emperor. 15.5.4: *altiora coeptantem*, 5: *salutis eius custodem*, 16: *culmen imperiale*, 17: *altius nititur, auguetur culmen*, 24: *tyrannide*, 29.1.37: *ex unius nutu* all invite notes on various aspects of these questions. At 25.3.18 the parallel passages on the duty of the emperor to care for all his subjects should have been cited, and more said about imperial *licentia*. At 29.1.10 there is a reasonable note on Valens' abuse of power, savagery and susceptibility to flattery, but there might yet have been more, especially as B. omits the very interesting reflexions in this chapter on the need to protect the emperor's security. Similarly at 29.1.27 more about *aequitas, rabies* and *saeuire*, with parallels, would have been welcome. Equally nothing is said about Ammianus' great interest in the behaviour of men placed in extreme or desperate situations, a topic pertinent to 15.5.16, 32 and 20.4.18, or of his obsession with caution and prudence, though both *cautus* and *prudens* occur. The one sedition selected is in no way related to Ammianus' treatment of other *seditiones* civil or military, and no comment on his concern with this subject is offered.

Nevertheless, what is here is largely good and well suited to the needs of a student audience. It is to be hoped that the book succeeds in stimulating interest in both Ammianus and the history of the fourth century.